Having performed the modern equivalent of the ancient practice of predicting the future based on examining the entrails of a sacrificial animal, I'd like to share my findings with this Committee.
The young Saudi Prince Muhammad, having sown his wild oats in Yemen, seems to have now been taken in hand by the elders of the clan. In the process, of course, he perpetrated the most notable war crime of the post-WW2 era. Having drawn in the US as a (probably reluctant) aider and abettor, he has also ruled out any valid grounds for the US media and sundry 'keepers of the world's conscience' to expostulate in horror every time Rami Abdelrahman announces from his London basement that the vile Assad's forces had killed a dozen or two civilians. Not that this will stop them, of course.
The clan elders steered Prince Muhammad (still the face of the regime, being the apple of his father the King's eye) to Cairo, where he was lectured on the facts of life by President el-Sisi (and then signed a pact between Egypt and Saudi Arabia). In the 'world according to Sisi', the villains are Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the various jihadi groups, while anyone fighting them, such as Assad of Syria, are good guys. Turkey is up to no good; it backed the MB and now supports the jihadis; it aims to re-establish its rule over the Arabs. Iran and Hizbullah are undoubtedly suspect as Shia, but have their hearts in the right place as they also fight jihadis. And, of course, all this needs lots of money, so thank you in advance for your generous assistance.
Field Marshal el-Sisi himself is currently on a roll, but his future is anything but certain. Having been let out from the penalty box where he'd been put for a while by the US, he has been compensated by a shower of F-16s, money, high-level visits, etc. With the blood he has already shed, and his continuing tough ways, he may have a suicide bomber get close enough some day. Or, if things start to go downhill in the country, another general or a junta may remove him.
The Saudis are going to end their Yemen misadventure; however, the young Prince is having one last fling to save face. With the Emiratis, he has launched a ground attack on the Houthis (presumably planned by American advisers). The hope is that when it succeeds in driving them from Sanaa, Yemeni 'President' Hadi and his ministers will be transported there, the Prince will declare "Mission Accomplished", and end the war. However, as he should have already learned, in war things often don't go according to plan; instead of saving face he may find himself with more muck on it. Meanwhile, AQAP, the local al Qaeda franchise, much strengthened by the war, will become a major threat to the Saudis and the Gulfies, while IS establishes itself there.
Saudi and Gulfie support for the jihadis (the al Qaeda 'front' (the JaF or Army of Conquest) and the IS) is going to dry up, except from Qatar, which likes to live dangerously, relying perhaps on its vast wealth and the military facilities it provides the US. Jordan will fall obediently in line, but whether its CIA-run 'operations room' will stop arming and funding any more JaF disguised as 'good guys' is an open question (the CIA is known to sometimes conduct its own foreign policy).
Another possible development is for the price of oil to go up. The Saudis and Gulfies have been pumping like mad, but now, with the sanctions being lifted, Iranian oil is going to flood back into the market, which could cause the price to collapse even further. The Arabs have already been feeling the pinch: with their exorbitant expenses to keep their 'royalty' in the style they're accustomed to, and to bribe their citizenry, most of them have been running short of money (and some rumoured to be running short of oil reserves as well!). They may well decide it's time to recall OPEC and turn down the spigots.
The US military is surprised at the results (or lack thereof) of its air campaign against IS. After a year of bombing, and claiming about 10,000 IS fighters killed, it finds IS's strength apparently unimpaired, enabling it to capture fresh territory while holding on to what it had already seized. This puzzlement has led to denial and some rather weak explanations. Perhaps they will twig to the obvious. Even though CENTCOM claims that its bombing has caused all of 2 civilian casualties, other reports speak of hundreds (in just the 52 incidents investigated). If the US military realises that it is the families, friends and neighbours of those killed that are bolstering IS's ranks, they may ease up on their air strikes (at least in Iraq).
Another surprise for the US military was the fate of the 60 Syrian fighters it had trained (with considerable fanfare) and then sent back into Syria, only to have them promptly mopped up by al-Nusra. There was some grumbling back home at the million dollar plus cost per lost fighter, but what these skinflints don't realise is that most of that went into the pockets of US contractors, which is all good for the US economy. The chances are the US will now accept the inevitable conclusion that the Free Syrian Army plan is a mirage, and the real choice is between the Assad government and the jihadis, even though it is unlikely to publicly acknowledge it. Especially after the Saudi switch.
That will leave Turkey alone in its anti-Assad policy (except, of course, for the jihadis). Recent moves leave Erdogan well placed to cope with this changed situation. Finding himself hemmed in by the Kurds, through their election success at home, and their progress in creating a Kurdish enclave in Syria (on Turkey's border), he switched gears, declared a campaign against IS, and promptly bombed the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. He also appears to have gotten the US to abandon the Syrian Kurds in return for being allowed to use the Incerlik airbase, with some murky agreement in the mix about establishing a 'safe haven' in Syria across the border.
Erdogan knows something that the US and the West haven't realised yet: there is no basic difference between al-Nusra, IS and other jihadi factions. The differences are all about leadership, not ideology or ultimate aims. If any one of them becomes too powerful somewhere, the others will ally with it, or see their followers switch allegiance. That is why Erdogan can afford to have his military carry out some token attacks against IS to please the US, while continuing support for al-Nusra. All of them are targetting Assad, and if he falls it will be the jihadis who will take over Syria. That would be fully in line with Erdogan's game plan of establishing a large Sunni 'base' in the ME under his control or influence.
So, the game goes on in the Middle East, as it has for the last hundred years.
But there is a bigger and more lasting change heading its way.
In the next couple of decades, this area will also be significantly affected by the profound changes occurring in the Eurasian "Heartland" as China implements its grand design of the One Belt One Road project.
The young Saudi Prince Muhammad, having sown his wild oats in Yemen, seems to have now been taken in hand by the elders of the clan. In the process, of course, he perpetrated the most notable war crime of the post-WW2 era. Having drawn in the US as a (probably reluctant) aider and abettor, he has also ruled out any valid grounds for the US media and sundry 'keepers of the world's conscience' to expostulate in horror every time Rami Abdelrahman announces from his London basement that the vile Assad's forces had killed a dozen or two civilians. Not that this will stop them, of course.
The clan elders steered Prince Muhammad (still the face of the regime, being the apple of his father the King's eye) to Cairo, where he was lectured on the facts of life by President el-Sisi (and then signed a pact between Egypt and Saudi Arabia). In the 'world according to Sisi', the villains are Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the various jihadi groups, while anyone fighting them, such as Assad of Syria, are good guys. Turkey is up to no good; it backed the MB and now supports the jihadis; it aims to re-establish its rule over the Arabs. Iran and Hizbullah are undoubtedly suspect as Shia, but have their hearts in the right place as they also fight jihadis. And, of course, all this needs lots of money, so thank you in advance for your generous assistance.
Field Marshal el-Sisi himself is currently on a roll, but his future is anything but certain. Having been let out from the penalty box where he'd been put for a while by the US, he has been compensated by a shower of F-16s, money, high-level visits, etc. With the blood he has already shed, and his continuing tough ways, he may have a suicide bomber get close enough some day. Or, if things start to go downhill in the country, another general or a junta may remove him.
The Saudis are going to end their Yemen misadventure; however, the young Prince is having one last fling to save face. With the Emiratis, he has launched a ground attack on the Houthis (presumably planned by American advisers). The hope is that when it succeeds in driving them from Sanaa, Yemeni 'President' Hadi and his ministers will be transported there, the Prince will declare "Mission Accomplished", and end the war. However, as he should have already learned, in war things often don't go according to plan; instead of saving face he may find himself with more muck on it. Meanwhile, AQAP, the local al Qaeda franchise, much strengthened by the war, will become a major threat to the Saudis and the Gulfies, while IS establishes itself there.
Saudi and Gulfie support for the jihadis (the al Qaeda 'front' (the JaF or Army of Conquest) and the IS) is going to dry up, except from Qatar, which likes to live dangerously, relying perhaps on its vast wealth and the military facilities it provides the US. Jordan will fall obediently in line, but whether its CIA-run 'operations room' will stop arming and funding any more JaF disguised as 'good guys' is an open question (the CIA is known to sometimes conduct its own foreign policy).
Another possible development is for the price of oil to go up. The Saudis and Gulfies have been pumping like mad, but now, with the sanctions being lifted, Iranian oil is going to flood back into the market, which could cause the price to collapse even further. The Arabs have already been feeling the pinch: with their exorbitant expenses to keep their 'royalty' in the style they're accustomed to, and to bribe their citizenry, most of them have been running short of money (and some rumoured to be running short of oil reserves as well!). They may well decide it's time to recall OPEC and turn down the spigots.
The US military is surprised at the results (or lack thereof) of its air campaign against IS. After a year of bombing, and claiming about 10,000 IS fighters killed, it finds IS's strength apparently unimpaired, enabling it to capture fresh territory while holding on to what it had already seized. This puzzlement has led to denial and some rather weak explanations. Perhaps they will twig to the obvious. Even though CENTCOM claims that its bombing has caused all of 2 civilian casualties, other reports speak of hundreds (in just the 52 incidents investigated). If the US military realises that it is the families, friends and neighbours of those killed that are bolstering IS's ranks, they may ease up on their air strikes (at least in Iraq).
Another surprise for the US military was the fate of the 60 Syrian fighters it had trained (with considerable fanfare) and then sent back into Syria, only to have them promptly mopped up by al-Nusra. There was some grumbling back home at the million dollar plus cost per lost fighter, but what these skinflints don't realise is that most of that went into the pockets of US contractors, which is all good for the US economy. The chances are the US will now accept the inevitable conclusion that the Free Syrian Army plan is a mirage, and the real choice is between the Assad government and the jihadis, even though it is unlikely to publicly acknowledge it. Especially after the Saudi switch.
That will leave Turkey alone in its anti-Assad policy (except, of course, for the jihadis). Recent moves leave Erdogan well placed to cope with this changed situation. Finding himself hemmed in by the Kurds, through their election success at home, and their progress in creating a Kurdish enclave in Syria (on Turkey's border), he switched gears, declared a campaign against IS, and promptly bombed the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. He also appears to have gotten the US to abandon the Syrian Kurds in return for being allowed to use the Incerlik airbase, with some murky agreement in the mix about establishing a 'safe haven' in Syria across the border.
Erdogan knows something that the US and the West haven't realised yet: there is no basic difference between al-Nusra, IS and other jihadi factions. The differences are all about leadership, not ideology or ultimate aims. If any one of them becomes too powerful somewhere, the others will ally with it, or see their followers switch allegiance. That is why Erdogan can afford to have his military carry out some token attacks against IS to please the US, while continuing support for al-Nusra. All of them are targetting Assad, and if he falls it will be the jihadis who will take over Syria. That would be fully in line with Erdogan's game plan of establishing a large Sunni 'base' in the ME under his control or influence.
So, the game goes on in the Middle East, as it has for the last hundred years.
But there is a bigger and more lasting change heading its way.
In the next couple of decades, this area will also be significantly affected by the profound changes occurring in the Eurasian "Heartland" as China implements its grand design of the One Belt One Road project.
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